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I. INTRODUCTION
This article will examine the relationship between the individual's
interest in privacy, reflected in such recent statutes as the Privacy Act of
1974, I and the public's right to know, which underlies legislation like
the Freedom of Information Act.2 The subject is of intrinsic impor-
tance, but it is particularly appropriate for an article in this lecture se-
ries, since privacy3 and disclosure4 were values of special interest to
Justice Douglas. Neither the individual's right to privacy5 nor the pub-
lic's right to know6 is explicitly protected by the Constitution, but both
do have constitutional overtones, and both are protected by various
statutory provisions.
Using federal income tax returns as the centerpiece of the discus-
sion, I propose to show how privacy and disclosure can come into con-
flict-a possibility that has been insufficiently recognized by the courts
and the commentators. The leading treatise on political and civil
rights,7 for example, treats the two subjects in separate chapters with
virtually no acknowledgement that they are related, let alone that they
• Copyright 1981 by Boris I. Bittker.
•• Sterling Professor of Law. Yale University. This article is the modified text of a speech
delivered at the Fifth Annual William O. Douglas Lecture Series. October 30. 1980.
I. Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 3, 88 Stat. 1897 (amended 1975 & 1977) codified at 5 U.S.C § 552a
(1976».
2. Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 383 (1966) (amended 1967, 1974, 1976 & 1978) (codified at 5
U.S.C § 552 (1976».
3. See W. DOUGLAS, POINTS OF REBELLION 29 (1970) (if "cause of privacy" is won in legis-
lative halls and constitutional assemblies, "this pluralistic society of ours will experience a spiri-
tual renewal;" if it is lost, "we will have written our own prescription for mediocrity and
conformity," id.) See also California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 85 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
4. See W. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS, 1939-1975, at 369 (1980) ("I have long favored
full disclosure by all elected or appointed federal officials of the amount of their income and the
source of it," id.). See also United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 198 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) ("secrecy is one of the most tempting coverups to save [governmental] regimes from
criticism," id. ).
5. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (privacy, though not
mentioned by the Constitution or the Bill of Rights, "share[s] constitutional protection in common
with explicit guarantees," id. at 580.
6. Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion in Richmond Newspapers, Inc., described the
decision as holding that "the First Amendment protects the public and the press from abridge-
ment of their rights of access to information about the operation of their government," id. at 584
(Stevens, J., concurring). See generally N. DORSEN, P. BENDER, & B. NEUBORNE, POLITICAL AND
CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES (4th ed. 1976); Emerson, The RighI ofPrivacy and Freedom
oflhe Press, 14 HARV. CR.-C.L.L. REV. 329 (1979); Gavison, Privacy and Ihe Limils ofLaw, 89
YALE LJ. 421 (1980); Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. CR.-C.L.L. REV. 233 (1977).
7. N. DORSEN, P. BENDER, & B. NEUBORNE, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED
STATES (4th ed. 1976).
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can be rivals requiring a choice between them.s The general tone, in-
stead, is that every increase in the people's right to know is a blow for
freedom, and every strengthening of the individual's shield of privacy
is also a step forward. Moreover, when commentators call for restric-
tions on the disclosure of personal data collected by the government in
such activities as law enforcement and the census, they often assume
disclosure, if permitted, would serve only to allow a malevolent or
heartless officialdom to stigmatize or embarrass individuals, and that
the resulting increase in public knowledge can serve no useful purpose.
I want to avoid this straw man by positing circumstances in which dis-
closure, however painful to the individuals, could be primarily moti-
vated by a defensible public interest; and in which, mutatis mutandis,
the public interest would be advanced at a heavy cost to the individu-
als.
To sharpen the issues, consider a proposal-not now on the legis-
lative agenda, but surely not wholly beyond the pale-requiring the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to open all federal income tax returns
to public inspection upon request. To present the conflict between dis-
closure and privacy in its sharpest form, I will limit myself to the dis-
closure of individual income tax returns; since corporate returns
contain fewer personal details, disclosure would be less dramatic. On
initial thought, one may be inclined not to applaud but to deplore the
hypothetical disclosure law, or even to view it as unthinkable; but con-
sider 'a page of history.
More than 100 years ago, when enacting the country's first federal
income tax to finance the Civil War, Congress provided that all returns
should be "open for examination."9 When this instruction was nar-
rowly construed by the Treasury Department, Congress provided ex-
plicitly that tax lists could be inspected by "any and all persons" on
request-a result initially applauded by the New York Times, 10 al-
though a few years later it denounced the disclosure of returns as "of-
fensive and objectionable."11 In 1909, when Congress imposed a
federal income tax on corporations,12 it provided that the returns "shall
constitute public records and be open to inspection as sUCh."13 Later
legislation, as we shall see, shifted from disclosure to confidentiality as
the general rule, but disclosure continued to have its supporters. In
8. Id Privacy is addressed in Chapter XII, Pri~acy, id at 938. The subject of disclosure is
discussed in Chapter III, Go~ernment Secrecy and the Public's Right to Know, it!. at 343. But see
Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Richtto Know, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. I.
9. Act of Aug. 5, 1861, ch. 45, §~ 49,50,51, 12 Stat. 309-11. This act was replaced before it
went into effect by Act of July I, 1862, ch. 119, § 89, 12 Stat. 473.
10. N.Y. Times, July 9, 1866, at 4, col. 4.
II. N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1869, at 4, col. 2.
12. Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 112.
13. Id at 116.
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192414 and again in 1934,15 for example, Congress enacted legislation
providing for limited disclosure of individual and corporate federal in-
come tax returns. In short, the idea that is now termed "the public's
right to know" was not invented yesterday.16
Let me now round out this hypothetical disclosure law by giving it
some legislative history. Assume that when the proposal was before
Congress witnesses testified (l) that the Internal Revenue Code is rid-
dled with special-interest provisions; (2) that tax reform is made diffi-
cult by the public's lack of information about the persons and classes
who benefit from or are harmed by particular provisions; (3) that pub-
lic analysis and political action would be enhanced if commentators
could point to the facts rather than merely speculate about the impact
of tax legislation; and (4) that access to the tax returns of legislators,
lobbyists, witnesses before legislative committees, contributors to politi-
cal campaigns, journalists, and persons expressing opinions about tax
legislation would enable the public to decide whether their views and
actions were disinterested or self-serving.
Assume further that the witnesses acknowledged that publication
of returns with the taxpayer's name deleted would supply some of the
desired information and that some candidates for public office might be
impelled by public pressure to publish their own returns, but that these
would be, at best, half-way measures; nothing short of mandatory dis-
closure with the taxpayers' names would open the road to comprehen-
sive tax reform. In addition, it was argued that many provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code are disguised subsidies to favored taxpayers
rather than genuine income-measuring rules, and that recipients of
these so-called tax expenditures should be required to stand up and be
counted when they claim benefits from the Treasury.'7
Finally, the hypothetical preamble asserted that there is only a dif-
ference of degree, not of kind, between audits of tax returns and judi-
cial proceedings. Congress went on to state that the following comment
by the Supreme Court, in a case holding the press cannot be excluded
from the trial of a criminal case except for overriding reasons, can be
appropriately applied to the audit of tax returns:
14. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 257, 43 Stat. 293. In 1926 the provision requiring the
amount of tax to be made public was removed. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 257, 44 Stat. 52.
15. Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 55, 48 Stat. 698. The act allowed for public examination
and inspection of tax returns. Id
16. For a detailed review of the 1861-1934 disclosure rules for federal income tax returns, see
U.S. ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE, ADMtNISTRATIVE PROCEDURES OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE, S. Doc. No. 266, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 835-46 (1976) [hereinafter cited as ADMINISTRA-
TIVE PROCEDURES OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE).
17. For the tax expenditure concept, see Bittker, Accounting for Federal "Tax Subsidies" in
the National Budget, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 244 (1969); Surrey & Hellmuth, The Tax Expenditure
Budget-Response to Professor Rillker, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 528 (1969); Bittker, The Tax Expenditure
Budget-A Reply to Professors Surrey and Hellmuth, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 538 (1969).
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The open processes of justice serve an important prophylactic pur-
pose, providing an outlet for community concern, hostility, and emo-
tion. . . . The crucial prophylactic aspects of the administration of
justice cannot function 10 the dark. . . A result considered untoward
may undermine public confidence, and where the trial has been con-
cealed from public view an unexpected outcome can cause a reaction
that the system at best has failed and at worst has been corrupted. IS
Having set the stage for a clash of opinions, I want now to shift to
a level of analysis that is both more prosaic and more focused by
describing how the conflict between confidentiality and disclosure is
resolved by existing law. To do so, I must first summarize the threshold
rules determining the data available to the IRS, since any confidential-
ity or disclosure requirement can operate only On the information pos-
sessed by the government. As every aficionado of spy stories knows,
what a secret agent doesn't know he can't disclose.
II. THE IRS' SOURCES OF INFORMATION
A. Tax Returns
To file even a relatively modest federal income tax return an indi-
vidual taxpayer must disclose not only his or her social security
number, employer, wages, investment income, and other receipts, but
also such personal details as place of residence, marital status, depen-
dents, charitable and political contributions, union dues, and medical
expenses. The history of the federal income tax indicates the list of
items of this type will not shrink in the foreseeable future; but, if any-
thing, will grow longer.
In requiring such disclosures, the federal income tax is totally dif-
ferent from most other taxes. Local real property and state sales taxes,
for example, make few distinctions among taxpayers, and virtually
nOne of these distinctions turns On highly personal characteristics that
taxpayers normally would wish to keep to themselves. Indeed, the re-
tail sales tax is so impersonal that the taxpayer's name is irrelevant,
unless an exemption is claimed because the goods are to be resold in
the course of business. Local real property tax records are open to pub-
lic inspection,19 but they show only the name of the owner of the prop-
erty, the amount at which it is assessed, liens reflecting the owner's
failure to pay On the due date, and, possibly, the existence of a veteran's
or other exemption. These bits of information obviously reveal far less
about the taxpayer than even the simplest federal income tax return.
In preparing their federal income tax returns, taxpayers who value
their privacy may forego some deductions or other allowances to keep
18. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571 (1980).
19. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 45-201 (Supp. 1980).
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the details to themselves-the expense of consulting a psychiatrist, for
example, or contributions to an unpopular religious cult-but this prac-
.tice can be expensive and it is not entirely clear that a taxpayer can
properly report more than his true taxable income.2o In any event,
even if a taxpayer can properly pass up a deduction if his sole objective
is the preservation of privacy, that is a price very few taxpayers will
pay.
Moreover, if the intrusion on privacy results not from claiming a
deduction or other tax benefits, but from reporting an item of income,
the taxpayer cannot even buy his way out. To be sure, if disclosure
would be incriminating, the fifth amendment protects the taxpayer; but
the scope of this shield is unclear. In United States v. Sullivan,zl a 1927
opinion of the United States Supreme Court ruling that unlawful busi-
ness profits are taxable, the Court held that the fifth amendment did
not justify a refusal by the taxpayer "to state the amount of his income
[on the return] because it had been made in crime,"22 but the Court
implied that the taxpayer could have refused to answer specific incrimi-
nating questions.23 In practice, taxpayers who fear self incrimination
but who are even more fearful of being prosecuted for tax evasion or
failure to file a return often file returns reporting their income (or at
least as much as they think the IRS could independently prove they
received) in round numbers, with an uninformative label such as "mis-
cellaneous" or "various." It may be, however, that taxpayers wishing
to rely on the fifth amendment must explicitly cite it and that a failure
to do so is a waiver of the privilege, permitting the IRS to compel dis-
closure of the details that the taxpayer hopes to conceal,24 Judging
from the lack of litigated cases, however, the IRS has not pursued this
possibility but instead treats vague labels as an informal method of
claiming the privilege against self-incrimination.
In any event, as a ground for keeping information from the IRS,
the fifth amendment is of no use to the average law-abiding citizen,
who has no justification for claiming that the information required by
the tax return will be incriminating.
Are there any other grounds for refusing to supply the information
called for by the return? Taxpayers have offered a mixed bag of ex-
cuses, such as the claim that it is an unconstitutional invasion of reli-
20. I once represented a professional gambler who deliberately refrained from deducting
charitable contributions, local taxes, casualty losses, dependency exemptions, and medical ex-
penses, hoping that a low profile would help to avoid a potentially embarrassing audit of his
financial activities. Since I did not prepare his returns, I was not called upon to decide whether
the practice was legally vulnerable; but I could not have given a quick answer to that question.
21. 274 U.S. 259 (1927).
22. fd at 264.
23. fd
24. For the vague doctrine of waiver, see Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 154-57
(1958); 8\ AM. ]UR. 2d Witnesses §§ 63-65 (\976).
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gious freedom to require taxpayers claiming deductions for religious
contributions to identify the donee church. But claims of this type have
been routinely rejected by the courts and the same fate has attended
virtually all assertions that questions asked by the return are beyond
the IRS' statutory authority to propound.25 It would be an overstate-
ment to claim these defenses are never valid; but for practical purposes
they are so peripheral that taxpayers concerned about privacy can re-
gard them as non-existent. In short, a desire for privacy is simply not a
basis for withholding information required by the tax return.
B. Record-keeping
Taxpayers are required by Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) § 6001
to "keep such records, render such statements, [and] make such returns
... as the [IRS] may from time to time prescribe.26 The IRS, pursuant
to this statutory grant of authority, requires taxpayers to "keep such
permanent books of account or records, including inventories, as are
sufficient to establish the amount of gross income, deductions, credits,
or other matters required to be shown ... in any return."27 This obli-
gation is as vague as it is broad, and it contains precious few escape
routes for taxpayers who want to preserve their privacy.
C. IRS Power to Issue Summons
The records kept by taxpayers pursuant to I.R.c. § 6001 and the
regulations thereunder might not see the light of day, however, were it
not for the investigative authority conferred on the IRS by I.R.C.
§ 7602. This provision empowers the IRS to "examine any books, pa-
pers, records, or other data which may be relevant or material" in de-
termining the tax liability of any person. It also allows the IRS to issue
administrative summons requiring taxpayers and third persons "to pro-
duce [any relevant or material] books, papers, records, or other data"
before an IRS official. Although enforcement of an administrative
summons requires a court order, the Supreme Court ruled in United
States v. Powe/f28, decided in 1964, that enforcement does not require a
probable cause showing but only that the investigation will be con-
ducted pursuant to a legitimate purpose, the inquiry may be relevant to
the purpose, the IRS does not already have the material demanded,
25. See, e.g., United States v. Stout, 601 F.2d 325 (7th Cir. 1979) (Form 1040 identifying
taxpayer by name and address but otherwise blank save for objections based on first, fourth,
seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, thirteenth, fourteenth and sixteenth amendments; conviction for fail-
ure to file returns affirmed); Cupp v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 68 (1975), ajf'dper curiam, 559 F.2d
1207 (3d Cir. 1977); Roberts v. Commissioner, 62 T.e. 834, 838-39 (1974); Muste v. Commis-
sioner, 35 T.e. 913 (1961) (freedom of religion not violated).
26. I.R.e. § 6001.
27. Treas. Reg. § 1.6001-I(a), T.O. 7577, 1979-1 C.B. 409.
28. 379 U.S. 48 (1964).
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and that a few formal threshold procedural steps have been taken.29
These requirements are not very confining and they rarely provide tax-
payers with even the shadow of a justification for resistance. Indeed,
tax practitioners comply with the overwhelming bulk of IRS requests
for records without waiting for a summons, recognizing that intransi-
gence usually does no more than prolong the agony and that it may
reduce the chance of compromising any debatable issues.
The principal grounds for resisting a summons are that the infor-
mation requested is not relevant or material; that disclosure would
breach a common-law privilege, such as the relationship between attor-
ney and client, husband and wife, or physician and patient, and that
the information is covered by the privilege against self-incrimination.30
Of these potential defenses, claims that the information requested by
the IRS is not relevant or material are easily made but almost never
upheld. The common-law privileges rarely apply because information
sought by the IRS is seldom received in the course of a confidential
relationship. By contrast, the self-incrimination claim is normally ac-
cepted at face value by the IRS-although this usually results in a more
vigorous investigation since a refusal to answer questions is virtually
certain to whet the appetite of any red-blooded revenue agent.
D. The Required Records Doctrine
Curiously, it is possible that the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, though routinely accepted by the IRS as a barrier to an adminis-
trative summons, is not applicable to the books and records that
taxpayers are required by I.R.C. § 6001 to maintain. This tantalizing
possibility-so at odds with common understanding-stems from Sha-
piro v. United States,31 decided by the Supreme Court in 1948. Shapiro
involved a subpoena requiring a businessman to appear before an en-
forcement officer of the World War II Office of Price Administration
with his sales records, kept pursuant to regulations under the Emer-
gency Price Control Act.32 A divided Court held that the privilege
against self-incrimination was not violated by the subpoena, because
the privilege does not encompass "records required by law to be kept in
order that there may be suitable information of transactions which are
the appropriate subjects of governmental regulation."33
29. Id at 57-58.
30. See generally Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976); Bellis v. United States, 417
U.S. 85 (1974); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973); United States v. Noall, 587 F.2d 123
(2d Cir. 1978), cerl. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979); United States v. Malnik, 489 F.2d 682 (5th Cir.
1974).
31. 335 U.S. 1 (\948). Justice Douglas joined the majority in this case, which was decided by
a 5-to-4 vote.
32. Act of Jan. 30, 1942, ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23-37 (terminated June 30, \947 under provisions of
Act of July 25, 1946, ch. 67\, § 1, 60 Stat. 664).
33. 335 U.S. at 33 (ciWtg Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 589-90 (\946».
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Shapiro did not explicitly hold that the records kept by the busi-
n.essman in that case became public documents; but the required
records doctrine comes close to investing the regulated citizen with the
mantle of an unpaid, involuntary recorder of deeds who must record his
own deeds. In a sharply-worded dissent, Justice Frankfurter asserted:
"If records merely because required to be kept by law ipso facto be-
come public records, we are indeed living in glass houses."34 He went
on to suggest the government might not need a search warrant to enter
and seize public records at any time, no matter where they are stored.35
Shapiro has never been overruled and, indeed, has been favorably
cited by the Supreme Court on several recent occasions.36 But it has
fallen into desuetude at the level of practice since, as previously
noted,37 the IRS regularly accepts self-incrimination as a valid defense
to a summons demanding production of an individual taxpayer's books
and records. Although this failure of the government to utilize the re-
quired records doctrine is surprising, one must recall that the privilege
against self-incrimination is of no help to taxpayers who object to pro-
ducing their books and records or to answering questions on privacy
grounds rather than because they fear prosecution. For these taxpay-
ers, the IRS' authority is overwhelmingly broad, whether the required
records doctrine is applicable to tax records or not.
In saying this, I do not mean to imply that the required records
doctrine is without significance to taxpayers hoping for privacy. For
them, the doctrine is a potential threat. The more one pushes the the-
ory that records kept under compulsion are tantamount to public
records, the more plausible it becomes to argue the public has a right to
know the contents of these so-called public records. To use a dramatic
simile offered by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the Shapiro case, if the
records kept by a taxpayer under legal compulsion are public docu-
ments, then the place where they are kept-even if it is a taxpayer's
residence or place of business-ean be likened to a public library,
which must be thrown open to all who want to read, not merely to
government officials.38
E. Third Party Records
In gaining information, the IRS can rely not only on information
reported on tax returns and on records that taxpayers are required to
keep, but also on records that third persons are required to maintain
34. Id at 51 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
35. Id at 54-55 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
36. See, e.g., United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 122 (1979); New Jersey v. Portash,
440 U.S. 450, 457 n.7 (1979).
37. See note 30 and accompanying text supra.
38. 335 U.S. at 55 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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and produce for official inspection. These third party sources have long
been important in many circumstances, but California Bankers Associa-
tion Y. Shultz ,39 a 1974 Supreme Court decision, brought to the surface
a number of legal issues in holding that the record-keeping provisions
of the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 are constitutional.
In California Bankers, the Court held that Congress could properly
authorize the Treasury to require banks to maintain records of their
customers' identity, to make and retain microfilm copies of checks and
other documents, and to report certain foreign banking transactions in
excess of $5,000 as well as domestic deposits and withdrawals of cur-
rency exceeding $10,000.40 The Court declined to pass on certain con-
stitutional objections to the legislation, including a privacy claim,41 on
the ground that they were advanced prematurely. Two of the justices
who joined in the majority opinion-Powell and Blackmun-filed a
concurring opinion suggesting Congress had gone about as far as they
would permit:
A significant extension of the regulations' reporting requirements,
however, would pose substantial and difficult constitutional ques-
tions for me. In their full reach, the reports apparently authorized by
the open-ended language of the Act touch upon intimate areas of an
individual's personal affairs. Financial transactions can reveal much
about a person's activities, associations, and beliefs. At some point,
governmental intrusion upon these areas would implicate legitimate
expectations of privacy. Moreover, the potential for abuse is particu-
larly acute where, as here, the legislative scheme permits access to
this information without invocation of the judicial process.42
For Justice Douglas, who dissented, Congress had already gone
too far. But even he did not elevate the claim of privacy above all other
considerations: "Customers have a constitutionally justifiable expecta-
tion of privacy in the documentary details of the financial transactions
reflected in their bank accounts. That wall is not impregnable. Our
Constitution provides the procedures whereby the confidentiality of
one's financial affairs may be disclosed."43 It is not clear, however,
what Justice Douglas meant by this qualification.44 If he meant that
the legislation would have been acceptable if it provided a method by
which taxpayers could object to the disclosure of their financial records
to the IRS on self-incrimination grounds alone, his theory would not be
39. 416 U.S. 21 (1974). The decision elicited a majority opinion, a concurring opinion, and
three dissenting opinions, including one by Justice Douglas.
40. Id. at 45-52.
41. The American Civil Liberties Union, one of the plaintiffs in the case, contended that the
legislation could result in disclosure of its members and contributors through an examination of
the organization's bank records. The Court, however, dismissed this claim as premature. See id.
at 55-56, 75-76.
42. Id. at 78-79 (Blackmun, J., joining Powell, J., concurring).
43. Id. at 82 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
44. "Procedures" might refer to the constitutional rules governing search warrants.
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comforting to taxpayers who object to disclosure solely on privacy
grounds and who have no ground for claiming that disclosure would be
incriminating. If he meant there is substantive privacy protection, his
reference to "the procedures whereby the confidentiality of one's
financial affairs may be disclosed" is puzzling.
In any event, Justice Douglas, who found the legislation constitu-
tionally invalid, described its consequences for privacy as follows:
A mandatory recording of all telephone conversations would be bet-
ter than the recording of checks under the Bank Secrecy Act, if Big
Brother is to have his way. The records of checks-now available to
the investigators-are highly useful. In a sense a person is defined by
the checks he writes. By examining them the agents get to know his
doctors, lawyers, creditors, political allies, social connections, reli-
gious affiliatiOn, educational interests, the papers and magazines he
reads, and so on adinfinitum. These are all tied to one's social secur-
ity number; and now that we have the data banks, these other items
will enrich that storehouse and make it possible for a bureaucrat-by
pushing one button-to get in an instant the names of the 190 million
Americans who are subversives or potential and likely candidates.45
A full analysis of California Bankers would require more time
than I can devote to it in this article; but I have said enough to lay the
ground for my main points:
1. It is of course true, as asserted by Justice Douglas, that bank
records provide many clues to the personality and activities of the
bank's customers.
2. But most banks kept records of this type even before they
were legally required to do so, as do many other persons (such as the
taxpayer's customers, suppliers and employees) who are not subject to
legal compulsion even now. The IRS now has the legal power to in-
spect these third party records and the taxpayer cannot prevent such an
inspection on either privacy or self-incrimination grounds. Given these
facts, and the business needs compelling financial institutions to keep
records for their own purposes, it is only a slight exaggeration to say
that, so far as privacy is concerned, the holding in California Bankers
was much ado about nothing.
There is nothing in Justice Douglas' dissent to suggest that taxpay-
ers cannot be required to keep their own banking transaction records
to facilitate audits of their tax returns. Nor does Justice Douglas sug-
gest they can withhold their records from the IRS on privacy grounds,
as distinguished from self-incrimination grounds.
In short, if California Bankers had been decided as Mr. Justice
Douglas wanted, it would have been helpful to taxpayers with a self-
incrimination defense to the production of their own records, since they
45. 416 U.S. at 85 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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can refuse to produce their own records but cannot prevent a bank
from producing its records of the same transaction. But a contrary re-
sult in California Bankers would have done very little for taxpayers
who have a privacy objection to disclosure without an accompanying
self-incrimination objection.
F. Third Party Summons
As previously noted,46 when taxpayers are ordered by the IRS to
produce their books and records, they can refuse to comply with the
summons on self-incrimination and a few other narrow grounds, but
not on privacy grounds. If the subpoena is issued not to the taxpayer,
but to a bank, customer, supplier, or business associate with whom the
taxpayer has had dealings-a so-called third-party subpoena-the tax-
payer is allowed by I.R.C. § 7602 to intervene in some, but by no
means all, enforcement proceedings. This procedural right, however, is
usually an empty privilege since the taxpayer has virtually no substan-
tive grounds for preventing the IRS from inspecting third party
records.47 The fact that the taxpayer will be incriminated, for example,
is irrelevant.
To be sure, the taxpayer can object if production of the data will
violate the attorney-client or similar privilege; but the overwhelming
bulk of third party subpoenas are not vulnerable to this or to any other
legal objection. For practical purposes, therefore, the taxpayer's right
to intervene when the IRS seeks to inspect a third party's records of its
transactions with the taxpayer may delay, but it will rarely prevent,
IRS access to the data sought.
III. CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION OBTAINED BY THE IRS
I have spent a good deal of time showing that the power of the IRS
to get information about taxpayers, both from them and from third per-
sons with whom they deal, is extremely sweeping and that the right of
privacy48 plays virtually no role in this information-gathering process.
We are now ready to see whether the taxpayer can prevent the IRS
from disclosing this information or conversely, whether the public's
"right to know" requires disclosure. In other words, is the battle over
once the taxpayer's privacy has been breached; or does the taxpayer
have a last clear chance to prevent disclosure of the information to the
public?
46. See note 30 and accompanying text supra.
47. See generally S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 370, reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. 408.
48. The right to privacy, described by 1ustice Brandeis as "the right to be let alone," was
called by him "the right most valued by civilized men." -Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,
478 (1928) (Brandeis, 1., dissenting).
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Before examining the legal rules governing IRS use of taxpayer
data, I want to point out that whatever the rules, leakage is inevitable.
Aside from inadvertant violations, there are bound to be deliberate
leaks by officials with political axes to grind, by persons acting out of
malice, and by so-called whistle blowers who seek to expose what they
see, rightly or wrongly, as bureaucratic misconduct. Recent experience
shows that the detection and punishment of persons responsible for
leaks are problematical at best. Moreover, taxpayers who wish to liti-
gate their tax liabilities must open the relevant facts to judicial, and
hence to public, inspection. An Internal Revenue Code that differenti-
ates among taxpayers by reference to marital status, medical expenses,
sources of income, and the like, necessarily forces taxpayers to disclose
the relevant facts or bow to IRS determinations of their liability.
Turning now to current law, the basic legislation governing the
status of tax returns and return information is I.RC. § 6103, enacted in
1976 to replace a statutory provision whose legislative history can be
traced back to the Civil War federal income tax.49 Section 6103 begins
bravely enough-it provides that returns and return information shall
be confidential and forbids any federal official or employee (and cer-
tain other persons) to disclose any return or return information ob-
tained in connection with their official service. Severe penalties are
prescribed for violations of I.RC. § 6103's rules.50
B~t I.RC. § 6103 is not merely a privacy statute. Its initial prohi-
bition on disclosure is qualified by a very detailed set of rules allowing
disclosure to specified persons in specified circumstances. For purposes
of this article, the authorized recipients of returns and return informa-
tion can be divided into three categories: private persons; government
agencies concerned with tax administration; and other government
agencies. By ruthlessly suppressing a vast amount of detail, the access
allowed to these groups can be summarized as follows.
A. Private Persons
First, I.R.C. § 6103 does not give the general public a right to in-
spect tax return information. Disclosure to private persons is author-
ized only if the person has a special relationship to the taxpayer. For
, example, beneficiaries can inspect the returns of their trusts and estates;
partners can inspect their partnership's return; and shareholders own-
ing more than one percent of a corporation's stock can inspect its re-
turn.
49. See note 16 supra.
50. Unauthorized disclosures are felonies, punishable by a fine of up to $5,000 or imprison-
ment up to five years, or both, plus the costs of prosecution. I.R.C. § 7213. If the person violating
the rules contained in I.R.C. § 6103 is an officer or employee of the United States, he or she may
also be subject to the criminal penalties imposed by 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976).
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As will be seen, the raw data obtained from returns can be assem-
bled by the IRS or other government agencies into statistical tables,
and the Freedom of Information Act requires disclosure of these anon-
ymous summaries on demand.51 The public's so-calledrright to know,
however, does not entitle you to inspect your neighbor's tax return,
even if you are motivated not by idle curiosity but by a conviction that
disclosure could show that the neighbor is filing fraudulent returns, is
supporting the enactment or repeal of a statutory provision for selfish
reasons, or is running for public office while burdened with financial
interests that may affect his or her official behavior.
B. Tax Officials
Second, I.R.C. § 6103 allows disclosure to government officials
concerned with tax administration. This category of authorized recipi-
ents of returns and return information includes not only officials of the
Treasury and Department of Justice, whose need for the information is
obvious, but also state employees charged with tax responsibilities.
Even though these state officials are forbidden to make any further dis-
closures, it is obvious that every increase in the number of people au-
thorized to inspect federal income tax returns increases the possibility,
indeed, the likelihood, of unauthorized disclosures.
C. Federal Non/ax Agencies
Finally, I.R.C. § 6103 authorizes disclosure to federal agencies
outside the tax area, subject to very detailed provision. Of these, only
the most important provisions, those governing disclosure to the White
House and to Congress, will be addressed here.
Under I.R.C. § 6103(g), returns and return information may be
supplied to the White House only in response to a request signed "per-
sonally" by the President. The request must identify the taxpayer and
specify the reason for the requested disclosure or inspection. This re-
quirement of the President's personal sanction evokes memories of the
so-called enemies list compiled by President Nixon's staff, resulting in
selective audits of journalists, antiwar protesters, and other civic gad-
flies, as well as some less dramatic events during John F. Kennedy's
presidency.52 Section 6103(g) also authorizes the Treasury to disclose
return information about potential appointees to high-level executive
or judicial posts, limited to such matters as whether the designated in-
51. See Cliffv. IRS, 496 F. Supp. 568 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (IRS not obligated to "sanitize" tax
return information by deleting matter exempt from disclosure and releasing the remainder of the
documents).
52. In both cases, White House operatives acted in the President's name, but in such a way
that their actions could be disowned if and when they backfired. See ADMINISTRATIVE PROCE-
DURES OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 16, at 968-71.
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dividual filed income tax returns for the immediately preceding three
years, failed to make timely payment of any tax, or was the subject of a
fraud investigation or penalty.
These limits on White House fishing expeditions are buttressed by
the reporting requirements of I.R.C. § 6103(g)(5), under which the
Joint Committee on Taxation must be notified within thirty days after
the end of each calendar quarter of the names of the taxpayers involved
and the reasons for the requests. An exception is carved out for presi-
dential requests concerning persons who were officers or employees of
the executive branch of the federal government when the request was
made.
For Congressional demands for tax returns and return informa-
tion, I.R.c. § 6103(f) authorizes the IRS to comply with requests by the
chairmen of the House Ways and Means Committee, the Senate Fi-
nance Committee, the Joint Committee on Taxation, and the chief of
staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation. Returns and return informa-
tion that can be associated with particular taxpayers, however, are to be
furnished to the appropriate committee only in closed executive ses-
sion. Other committees of Congress may obtain returns and return in-
formation for use in closed executive session on written request by the
chairman, if authorized by the committee itself and by a resolution of
the Senate or the House or, in the case of joint committees, by concur-
rent resolution.
Once a legislative committee obtains a tax return, it can refer it to
the full Senate or House. But if the taxpayer can be identified, the
material must be submitted to a closed executive session of the Senate
or House unless the taxpayer consents to disclosure. Only a naive ob-
server, however, would have much faith in these attempts to keep
members of Congress from speaking freely, though some might take
the precaution of leaking the material to the press in lieu of publishing
it directly. When a barrier to publicity is installed on Capitol Hill, it is
bound to become a sieve in short order.
Besides the White House and Congress, federal and some state
and local agencies outside the tax area can obtain tax returns and re-
turn information for such diverse purposes as statistical studies, audits
of the IRS by the Comptroller General, administration of the social
security system (including enforcement of child support obligations),
determination of eligibility for food stamps, notification of persons en-
titled to unclaimed tax refunds, collection of defaulted government
loans to students, location of persons exposed to occupational hazards,
and numerous other specialized activities.53
53. I.R.C. § 6103(i), (j), (I), & (m). See Joyce, Raiding the Confessional-The Use oj"Income
Tax Returns in Nontax Criminal Investigations, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 1251 (1980).
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D. Safeguards and Enforcement
To insure compliance with these privacy-disclosure rules, I.R.C.
§ 6103(p) requires the Treasury and other government agencies to es-
tablish and maintain a permanent system of standardized records of
requests for returns and return information, as well as actual inspec-
tions and disclosures. It also provides for periodic reports to the Joint
Committee on Taxation and audits by the Comptroller General. In
addition, I.R.C. § 7217 authorizes persons injured by unauthorized dis-
closures to sue for actual and punitive damages. The crime of unautho-
rized disclosure was elevated in 1976 from a misdemeanor to a felony,
punishable by a fine of up to $5,000 and/or imprisonment for up to five
years.54
E. Freedom of Information Act
You may be surprised that I have virtually ignored the Freedom of
Information Act. This legislation enables the public to inspect rulings
and many other IRS documents, files, and memoranda, but it does not
encompass "matters [that are] specifically exempted from disclosure by
statute."55 Thus, it bows to the rules of I.R.C. § 6103, although some
peripheral aspects of the relationship between these two sets of rules
are obscure and remain to be elucidated.
IV. CONCLUSION
Let me now return to my hypothetical law, which would open all
federal income tax returns to public inspection. My conclusions can be
briefly stated.
First, the interest in privacy plays virtually no role in determining
what must be disclosed to the Internal Revenue Service on the tax-
payer's tax returns, what must be recorded in the taxpayer's books and
records and disclosed when the IRS wishes to inspect these books and
records, or what transactions with the taxpayer must be recorded by
third parties and disclosed to the IRS on demand.
Second, opening income tax returns to public inspection would re-
quire taxpayers to share their financial and many of their personal af-
fairs with the general public, not merely with government officials
bound by an obligation of secrecy.
Third, given the mass of information that must be supplied by tax-
payers to comply with the federal income tax, a choice must be made
between the public's desire to know and the individual's desire to live a
life of privacy.
54. I.R.C. § 7213(a).
55. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(e)(3) (1976).
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Fourth, the competing claims of privacy and public information
could be resolved by deleting taxpayer identifications and publishing
only statistical summaries or anonymous returns. But this compromise
would reject the public's right to know matters that, it can be plausibly
argued, are pertinent to decision-making in a democratic society.56
Finally, much of the discussion of the public's right to know stems
from complaints about the secrecy of governmental operations, involv-
ing information that is wholly or largely impersonal. Opinions may
differ about whether disclosure in these circumstances is good or bad,
but it seldom entails an invasion of anyone's privacy. The bureaucracy
and its staff may be embarassed, but the information sought is rarely
"personal," even though it may disclose the way public officials dis-
charged their public duties.
By contrast, the information that we have been considering con-
cerns the private behavior of private citizens, which is relevant to their
federal income tax liabilities but is otherwise personal. When journal-
ists, legislators, and jurists speak of the "public's right to know," there-
fore, they ought to distinguish between these two types of information.
It is possible, as the preamble to my suppositious disclosure statute sug-
gests, to build a case for requiring disclosure of what I have just loosely
called "personal information." But the disclosure of this type of infor-
mation would have a fundamentally different impact on privacy-an-
other cherished value-than disclosure of the type of impersonal
information that is ordinarily at stake in claims that the public's right
to know has been improperly restricted or should be enlarged. In short,
when privacy and the public's right to know are examined in the con-
text of the data disclosed by taxpayers on their federal income tax re-
turns, "[t]he clash between the right of privacy and the right to know is
obvious," since "[o]ne is almost the exact opposite of the other."57
56. Analysis of "the public's right to know" in the context of attempts by officialdom to
preserve "governmental secrets," which simply disregards the possibility that the "governmental
secrets" consist of data about private persons rather than official actions, is illustrated by the title
of Chapter III of the treatise on political and civil rights cited in note 6 supra-Government Secrecy
and the Public's Right to Know. See also Warren, Governmental Secrecy: Corruption's Ally, 60
A.B.AJ. 550 (1974). This article is Chief Justice Warren's last published address, which similarly
contrasts the public's right to know with secrecy claims asserted solely on behalf of governmental
activities.
57. Emerson, supra note 8, at 20.
